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1. INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing is surging in popularity across a wide range of production activities and
sectors. In the automobile industry, for instance, we see outsourcing ranging from product
designing, data processing, special components, assembly, and minor parts and components,
etc.1 Why do firms engage in very diﬀerent outsourcing business, some require high-skilled
labor and are very specialized but others are very simple and minor. For what kind of
intermediate input/service do firms often go outsourcing? Can we say anything about the
characteristics/attribute of the goods or services in outsourcing? The purpose of this paper
is to address these questions and understand the patterns of outsourcing.
To answer these questions and explain the recent surge in outsourcing activities, it is
important to understand the fundamental economic force behind outsourcing. Although
it is true that outsourcing is a means of cutting costs to stay competitive, it is not the
underlying economic force. A review of outsourcing activities in the automobile industry
will reveal the driving force behind the trend of outsourcing business. In the 1920s when
workers in the Ford Motor Company were getting the highest pay (much higher than all
others) in the industry, Ford did not seek outsourcing to reduce costs.2 The first sign of
outsourcing in the automobile industry, however, came at the beginning of 1920s when
the General Motors Company started a major innovation in producing automobiles by
focusing on economies of scope, rather than economies of scale, in production. The success
of Ford, and its relatively inexpensive automobile, was based on mass production of a
single, basically unchanging, product. In 1923 General Motors (lead by Alfred P. Sloan),
however, introduced the ‘car for every purse’ policy (i.e., diﬀerent cars for people with
diﬀerent incomes) and started annual model changes. To meet the competition of low-
cost cars and make model changes relatively cheaper, GM had to install multi-purpose
machines and design more common parts into the cars of various models. GM even published
1See details in WTO Annual Report 1998 (p.36), cited by Grossman and Helpman (2002).
2Henry Ford introduced the ‘five-dollar day’, which doubled the sums he was paying his work force at a
time when the American economy was beginning to lurch into a deep recession (Raﬀ, 1991). The discussion
in the rest of this paragraph benefits a great deal from Raﬀ (1991) and Cusumano (1985).
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its specification lists of some parts and components, thereby enabling other carmakers to
share in any upstream economies. These changes ultimately lead to outsourcing business
in the General Motors company and the automobile industry. GM’s innovation focusing on
economies of scope was further advanced by Japanese carmakers (Toyota and Nissan) after
the Second World War. To accommodate consumer preferences for product variety in the
changing world, in contrast to Ford’s vertically-integrated production system Toyota built
a flexible manufacturing system relying heavily on subsidiaries and other suppliers, which
had a profound impact on the increasing outsourcing activities in the Japanese automobile
industry. According to Edward Davis (1992), typically the degree of outsourcing is 60-70
percent in Toyota compared to 30-40 percent in General Motors.
Building on the work by Eaton and Schmitt (1994), I develop a model of two-stage pro-
duction in which economies of scope are central to the production of both the intermediate
and final good. Outsourcing comes as a natural result of vertical disintegration in produc-
tion. The key conflict of economic forces lies in the diﬀerence in the eﬃcient level economies
of scope between the two stages of production. The trade-oﬀ between production eﬃciency
and the market transaction cost determines whether the vertically-integrate or vertically-
disintegrated production will be the eﬃcient outcome. The model is able to explain the
patterns of outsourcing from the degree of product diﬀerentiation, economies of scope, and
economies of scale in production of the intermediate input relative to that of the final good.
The recent surge of outsourcing activities is explained by a new push (progress in the gen-
eral purpose technology, e.g., information technology) on an old fundamental (economies of
scope in production).
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, it is shown that in the absence
of economies of scope, vertically-integrated production is more eﬃcient than vertically-
disintegrated production. The reason for the result is that without economies of scope in
production of diﬀerentiated products, these two production structures are eﬀectively the
same but under vertical disintegration it requires additional costs for market transaction.
Secondly, when there are economies of scope in production, there is a trade-oﬀ between
production eﬃciency and market transaction cost. It is shown that vertical disintegration
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(and hence outsourcing) is more likely to occur if an intermediate input belongs to one of
these two opposite cases: (i) the intermediate input is highly diﬀerentiated/specialized, or
has a very low degree of economies of scope, or a very low degree of economies of scale
in production; (ii) it has a very small attribute space (close to a homogenous good), or
has a very high degree of economies of scope, or a very high degree of economies of scale
in production. Thirdly, a reduction in transaction cost always increases outsourcing but a
technology progress may not. However, continuous progresses in general purpose technology
that has a persistently biased eﬀect on economies of scope in one stage of production (e.g.,
final goods) over the other (e.g., intermediate goods) lead to more outsourcing activities.
Outsourcing became the most significant industrial phenomenon in the 1990s and has
widely spread across industries and national boundaries.3 A development of rigorous theo-
ries in this area began only recently. One approach in the literature has focused on the role
of trade liberalization, or globablization, to explain (international) outsourcing.4 Another
approach focuses on the theories of transaction cost and incomplete contract although glob-
alization still plays an important role in explaining outsourcing. In McLaren (2000), for
instance, globalization lowers transaction costs and therefore makes it easier for an input
supplier to find an attractive buyer abroad, which strengthens its bargaining power ex post
and thus makes an arm’s-length arrangement more attractive.
Grossman and Helpman (2002a, 2002b) recently have developed a wide-ranging theory
to explain outsourcing based on a number of issues that include the degree of market
competition, substitutability between final products, thickness of input suppliers, costs of
customizing inputs, and nature of the contracting environment. The current model focuses
only on a particular issue - economies of scope in production, which as the paper argues is
a fundamentally important economic force behind the wide-spread outsourcing activities.
The model allows us to discuss how outsourcing activities are aﬀected by the degree of
3See evidence of international outsourcing in Hanson (1996), Slaughter (1995), and Campa and Goldberg
(1997), among many others. See Feenstra (1998) for an overview on this topic. Also see Hummels, et al.
(2001) and Yi (2003) on a closely related topic - vertical specialization.
4E.g., see Jones (2000), Chen, et al. (2003), and the collections in Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and
Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001). Zhao (2001) explains outsourcing of multinationals by domestic unionization.
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product diﬀerentiation, economies of scope, and economies of scale in production of the
intermediate input relative to that of the final good.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic framework. We
first derive the equilibrium for both the vertically-integrated and vertically-disintegrated
production structures, and then find the eﬃcient equilibrium outcome. Section 3 character-
izes the equilibrium of vertically-disintegrated production and the patterns of outsourcing.
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks and thoughts about possible extensions of the
model.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Vertically-integrated (In-house) Production
In this model I extend the address model of Eaton and Schmitt (1994) to a two-stage
production structure, in which technology in both production stages exhibits economies of
scope. As in the standard circular model, each good is described by a point x in some
continuum of product attributes represented by a circumference of a circle of length L.
Each consumer is assumed to buy only one unit of the good and the utility from purchasing
one unit of good x at price p(x) for consumer i, for instance, is
Ui(x, p(x)) = V − p(x)− t|x− x∗i | (1)
where x∗i describes the consumer’s most preferred good (or the consumer’s address in the
attribute space), V is the consumer’s reservation price, and t is the marginal disutility of
distance in the attribute space. Assume that V is large so that all consumers consume
the good in equilibrium. There are φL consumers whose preference of attributes for the
most preferred good is uniformly distributed along the circumference, and hence φ is the
population density.
To produce one unit of output requires one unit of an intermediate input, and the tech-
nology in both production stages exhibits economies of scope. Specifically, a firm must first
incur a fixed cost to develop a basic product and then can produce variants by modifying
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the basic product, in both stages of production. Suppose that Xi denotes the location in
the attribute space of basic product i, and Yi that of the basic intermediate product corre-
sponding to Xi. Similarly, we use yj and xj to denote variant j’s locations in the space of
the final and intermediate products, respectively.
Assume that each firm owns only one basic product and therefore a firm is identified by
a basic product. Suppose that qi(xj) is the quantity of variant j (j = 1, ...,m) produced
from basic product i. This can be described by
(x,qxi ) = [(x1, q1), (x2,q2), ..., (xm, qm)].
Then, the overall production costs are given by the following expression,
C((x,qxi );Xi) = K + (m− 1)S +
mX
j=1
qi(xj)(ecyi + cx + rx|xj −Xi|) (2)
= K + (m− 1)S + C((y,qyi );Yi) +
mX
j=1
qi(xj)(cx + rx|xj −Xi|), K > 0, rx > 0
where ecyi is the average cost, and C((y,qyi );Yi) the total production cost of intermediate
input y given by
C((y,qyi );Yi) = k + (m− 1)s+
mX
j=1
qi(yj)(cy + ry|yj − Yi|), k > 0, ry > 0. (3)
K and k denote the sunk cost of developing the basic final and intermediate product (Xi
and Yi), and S and s the cost of switching from one variant to another. cy+ry|yj−Yi| is the
marginal cost of producing a unit of variant yj , where ry|yj−Yi| is the incremental marginal
cost of modification. Similarly, ecyi +cx+rx|xj−Xi| is the marginal cost of producing a unit
of variant xj using input yj . The further a variant (xj or yj) is away from its basic product,
the larger is the cost of modification.
It is important to note that the attribute space for the final good does not have to be the
same as that for the intermediate input. In general, the distance of |yj−Yi| is not identical
to that of |xj −Xi|. Suppose the length of the circumference of the attribute space for the
intermediate good is θL, as illustrated in Figure 1. If θ < 1 (resp. θ > 1), the degree of
product diﬀerentiation of the intermediate input is lower (resp. higher) than that of the
final good. When θ = 0, the intermediate input is a homogeneous good.
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2.1.1 Equilibrium without economies of scope
When there are no economies of scope in production, a firm produces only a basic product.
Then, (2) and (3) become:
C(Xi) = K + q
x
i (ecyi + cx) (4)
C(Yi) = k + cyq
y
i (5)
where qxi = q
y
i is the output, and ecyi = C(Yi)/qyi the average production cost of intermediate
input Yi.
Suppose there are n firms symmetrically located along the circumference of a circle in at-
tribute space. It is straightforward to show the following textbook results for the symmetric
equilibrium under free-entry:
px∗i = L/n
∗ + ecyi + cx, i = 1, ..., n (6)
ecyi = kn∗φL + cy, i = 1, ..., n (7)
n∗ = L(φ/K)1/2. (8)
Without loss of generality, we assume cx = cy = 0 [also using (8) and (7), and then (7) and
(6)] and therefore, the average production cost of the intermediate input and the price of
the final good become
ecyi = k/(Kφ)1/2, i = 1, ..., n (9)
px∗i = (K/φ)
1/2 + k/(Kφ)1/2, i = 1, ..., n (10)
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2.1.2. Equilibrium with economies of scope
Following Eaton and Schmitt (1994), we focus on the case of strong economies of scope
assuming that the switching cost S is equal to zero. In doing so we reduce the number of
parameters that describe economies of scope to one. For example, (2) now becomes,
C((x,qxi );Xi) = K +
mX
j=1
qi(xj)(ecyi + rx|xj −Xi|), K > 0, rx > 0 (11)
where rx is the only parameter that captures the degree of economies of scope in producing
the final good. The lower the value of rx, the smaller the marginal cost in producing a
variant and hence the higher the degree of economies of scope. Similarly (setting s = 0),
the total and average production costs of the intermediate input become
C((y,qyi );Yi) = k +
mX
j=1
qi(yj)ry|yj − Yi|), k > 0, ry > 0. (12)
ecyi = C((y,qyi );Yi)/ mX
j=1
qi(yj) (13)
LetMCi(x) denote firm i’s the marginal cost of producing good x, a variant located away
from Xi at a distance of x. Thus,
MCi(x) = ecyi + rx|x−Xi|
= ecyi + rxx (14)
Similar to Eaton and Schmitt, we focus on the case in which t > ecyi + rx for all i. Since
each firm can produce each good along the continuum circumference L, a price equilibrium
involves a complete price schedule for each firm. As shown by these authors, in such a
Bertrand equilibrium the most eﬃcient firm (e.g., in producing good x) sets the price for
the good equal to the marginal cost of the second most eﬃcient firm and makes the sale of
the good. Therefore, we obtain
p∗i (x) =MCi+1(x) = ecyi+1 + rx|L/n− x|, 0 ≤ x ≤ L/(2n) (15)
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Since t > rx, the consumer will always choose to buy her most preferred good in the
equilibrium. Figure 2, which is similar to Figure 1 in Eaton and Schmitt (1994), illustrates
this point. Suppose there are two neighboring basic products, Xi and Xi+1, owned by firm
i and firm i + 1. The dashed lines represent their marginal costs of production for any
good in attribute space and the solid line represents the equilibrium price schedule. The
dot-dashed lines are the indirect indiﬀerence curves of the consumer whose most preferred
good is x. Since t > rx, the slope of the indiﬀerence curves is greater than that of the price
schedule and therefore, the consumer buys good x obtaining the highest level of utility (i.e.,
the lowest obtainable indiﬀerence curve).
In the free-entry symmetric equilibrium, we obtain
ecy ≡ ecyi = ecyi+1, i = 1, ..., n (16)
p∗i (x) = ecy + rx(L/n− x), 0 ≤ x ≤ L/(2n), i = 1, ..., n (17)
and the entire continuum of goods is produced and each consumer purchases her most
preferred product. Therefore, the profit of each firm becomes
π∗i = 2
Z L/(2n)
0
[p∗i (x)−MCi(x)]qi(x)dx−K
= 2
Z L/(2n)
0
[rx(L/nx − x)− rxx]φdx−K (18)
=
φrx
2
(
L
n
)2 −K
As Eaton and Schmitt (1994, pp.880) shows, the equilibrium profit of firm i is independent
of the ownership structure of the basic products, which is a reassurance of our earlier
assumption that each firm owns one basic product.
Free entry will drive π∗i down to zero. Ignoring the integer problem, we obtain the
equilibrium number of firms,
n∗ = L(
φrx
2K
)1/2 (19)
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Similar to (13) and (12), the average cost of the intermediate good becomes,5
ecy ≡ ecyi = k + 2 R θL/(2n∗)0 qi(y)ryydy
2
R θL/(2n∗)
0 qi(y)dy
=
k + 2
R θL/(2n∗)
0 (φryy/θ)dy
2
R θL/(2n∗)
0 (φ/θ)dy
(20)
=
k + (θryK)/(2rx)
(2φK/rx)1/2
= k(
rx
2φK
)1/2 +
θry
2
(
K
2φrx
)1/2
Therefore, the equilibrium price of any good x, located away from a basic product at distance
x becomes
p∗i (x) = k(
rx
2φK
)1/2 +
θry
2
(
K
2φrx
)1/2 + rx[(
2K
φrx
)1/2 − x], i = 1, ..., n (21)
where x ∈ [0, ( K
φrx
)1/2].
2.2 Vertically-disintegrated Production and Eﬃcient EquilibriumOutcome
Now consider the case in which production is vertically-disintegrated and there are inde-
pendent firms and market for the intermediate input. To avoid any unnecessary strategic
action in the intermediate-input market and focus on the fundamental economic force in
production - production eﬃciency, I assume that firms that produce the intermediate input
follow the average-cost pricing rule.6 Furthermore, there is a transaction cost: final-good
producers have to incur an additional cost in purchasing a unit of the intermediate input.
5Notice that for the attribute space of intermediate input y, the length of the circumference becomes θL,
and the density φ/θ.
6 It is not clear whether marginal-cost pricing would be superior to average-cost pricing, given that there
is a fixed cost of production in this monopolistically competitive market. While the assumption simplifies
the analysis and helps bring out the main insight, nevertheless it is a limitation of our analysis.
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2.2.1 Equilibrium without economies of scope
When there are no economies of scope, only the basic products will be produced and
therefore in equilibrium the number of the basic final-good products has to equal to that of
the basic intermediate-input products (since an intermediate input does not have any value
unless it targets a corresponding final product). Then, the equilibrium is exactly the same
as in Section 2.1.1 except now firms have to pay an additional transaction cost for each unit
of input they buy from the intermediate-input market. Therefore, vertically-disintegrated
production is not as eﬃcient as vertically-integrated production.
Proposition 1 In the absence of economies of scope, the equilibrium of vertically-integrated
production is eﬃcient.
2.2.2. Equilibrium with economies of scope
When there are economies of scope, the number of the basic intermediate-input products
does not have to equal to that of the basic final-good products. Suppose there are ny firms
in the intermediate-input market and they are located symmetrically along a circumference
θL in the attribute space. Then, the total cost for a representative firm, firm i, is
C((y,qyi );Yi) = k + 2
Z θL/(2ny)
0
qj(y)ryydy
= k + 2
Z θL/(2ny)
0
(φryy/θ)dy (22)
= k +
θφry
4
(
L
ny
)2
Average-cost pricing gives the following expression for the price of the intermediate input,
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pyi =
C((y,qyi );Yi)
2
R θL/(2ny)
0 qj(y)dy
=
k + (θφry/4)(L/ny)
2
2
R θL/(2ny)
0 (φ/θ)dy
(23)
=
k + (θφry/4)(L/ny)
2
φL/ny
= (kny +
θφryL
2
4ny
)/(φL)
Free-entry will drive down this price to the minimum. Therefore, the equilibrium number
of firms in the intermediate-input market is given by
n∗y = argmin (kny +
θφryL
2
4ny
)/(φL)
= L(
θφry
4k
)1/2 (24)
Thus, we obtain the price of the intermediate input in the symmetric equilibrium,
py ≡ pyi = (kn∗y +
θφryL
2
4n∗y
)/(φL)
= [k(
θφry
4k
)1/2 +
L
2
(θφkry)
1/2]/(φL) (25)
= (
kθry
φ
)1/2 i = 1, ..., n
Lemma 1 ecy = py when (krx)/(Kθry) = 1/2; otherwise, ecy > py.
Proof: Using (20) and (25), we obtain
ecy
py
= (
1
2
)1/2(
krx
Kθry
)1/2 + (
1
8
)1/2(
Kθry
krx
)1/2 (26)
= Ω(1
2
)1/2 +
1
Ω(
1
8
)1/2
where Ω ≡ [(krx)/(Kθry)]1/2. It is straightforward to show that (26) reaches the minimum
at Ω = (1/2)1/2.
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Lemma 1 basically says that in general the minimum average production cost of the
intermediate input in the equilibrium of vertically-integrated production is higher than that
of vertically-disintegrated production. The intuition for the result is actually quite simple
since under vertically-integrated production the number of firms producing the intermediate
input is constrained by (i.e., equal to) the number of the final-good producers.
With vertically-disintegrated production, however, there is a transaction cost in purchas-
ing the intermediate input. For simplicity, I assume that the transaction cost is measured in
units of the intermediate input and takes the form similar to ice-berg transport cost. Specif-
ically, to use one unit of the intermediate input in production, a final-good producer has to
buy 1+ τ units of the intermediate input. Alternatively, this also means that the price for
using a unit of the intermediate input in production now becomes pyi (1 + τ), rather than
pyi . Therefore, there is a trade-oﬀ between production eﬃciency and the market transaction
cost.
In this model, production eﬃciency (also the overall economic eﬃciency here) of the two
equilibria hinges on the production costs of the intermediate input. Solving ecy ≤ pyi (1 + τ)
gives us the following result, which is illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 2 When there are economies of scope in production, the equilibrium of vertically-
integrated production remains eﬃcient if and only if (krx)/(Kθry) ∈ [Ω2L(τ),Ω2U (τ)], where
Ω2L(τ) ≡ {(1 + τ) − [(1 + τ)2 − 1]1/2}2/2 and Ω2U (τ) ≡ {(1 + τ) + [(1 + τ)2 − 1]1/2}2/2;
Otherwise, the equilibrium of vertically-disintegrated production is eﬃcient.
Therefore, when (krx)/(Kθry) is either smaller than Ω2L(τ), or greater than Ω2U (τ), we
have pyi (1 + τ) < ecy and hence the equilibrium of vertically-disintegrated production domi-
nates the equilibrium of vertically-integrated production. That is, vertically-disintegrated
production (and hence outsourcing) becomes the eﬃcient equilibrium outcome. The next
section discusses in details the patterns of outsourcing and some comparative statics.
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3. OUTSOURCING
3.1. Patterns of Outsourcing
The results in Proposition 2 are also useful for discussing the patterns of outsourcing.
From Proposition 2, notice that vertical disintegration (or outsourcing) is more likely to
occur if (krx)/(Kθry) is further away from 1/2, either very small or very large. We shall
focus our discussion on three key parameters that describe the nature of the intermediate
input and production technology. They are θ (product diﬀerentiation), ry (economies of
scope), and k (fixed cost of production - an indicator of economies of scale).
First, a high value of θ means that the intermediate input is highly diﬀerentiated (or
specialized), and a low value indicates that the attribute space of the intermediate input is
small. When θ approaches to zero, the intermediate input becomes a homogeneous good
(the attribute circumference of good y in Figure 1 shrinks to a point). Our theory suggests
that firms will more likely go outsourcing for these two very diﬀerent types of intermediate
input: either highly diﬀerentiated/specialized, or hardly diﬀerentiated.
Secondly, a high value of ry means that it is very costly for a firm to produce all the
variants from its basic product. A low value of ry means, however, that the economies of
scope is very high. Thus, a wide range of variants should be available more economically in
the intermediate-input market although a vertically-integrated firm can also produce all the
required variants of the intermediate input by itself. Therefore, it is more likely that firms
will go outsourcing for those intermediate inputs whose economies of scope in production
are either very low or very high.
Finally, if the fixed cost of production k is high, vertically-integrated firms cannot fully
explore the economies of scale in producing the intermediate input by themselves compared
to the intermediate-input market. On the other hand, if k is very low, there should exist
many basic intermediate products (or suppliers) in the market and therefore, the cost of
producing all the variants would be lower (since less modification is needed) compared to
vertically-integrated production. The next proposition summarizes these results.
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Proposition 3 Outsourcing is more likely to occur if an intermediate input belongs to one
of these two opposite cases: (i) the intermediate input is highly diﬀerentiated/specialized,
or has a very low degree of economies of scope, or a very low degree of economies of scale
in production; (ii) it has a very small attribute space (close to a homogenous good), or has
a very high degree of economies of scope, or a very high degree of economies of scale in
production.
In the above discussion we have focused on the parameters of the intermediate input.
To better understand why outsourcing is more likely to occur under these two opposite
scenarios, we shall note that what really matters here is the relative degree of the final good
and the intermediate input in product diﬀerentiation (θ relative to 1), economies of scope
(rx/ry), and economies of scale (k/K) in production. They determine the ratio between the
eﬃcient number of firms in the final-good production and that in the intermediate-input
production.
The eﬃcient number of firms in the final-good production, n∗x, is given by (19). When
each firm produces the intermediate input in-house, the number of the basic intermediate
products, ny, is equal to n∗x. When the two stages of production are disintegrated, the
eﬃcient number of the basic intermediate products, n∗y, is given by (24). From (19) and
(24), we obtain
ny
n∗y
= (
2krx
Kθry
)1/2. (27)
Notice that ny = n∗y only if (krx)/(Kθry) = 1/2. When ny > n
∗
y, there are too many basic
intermediate products and hence vertically-integrated production involves too much fixed
costs. When ny < n∗y, there are too few basic intermediate products and hence vertically-
integrated production involves too much modification costs in producing all the variants.
Therefore, whether the equilibrium of vertically-disintegrated production (or outsourcing)
will dominate the equilibrium of vertically-integrated production depends on the trade-
oﬀ between the above economic eﬃciency in production vs. the market transaction costs
associated with outsourcing.
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3.2. Transaction Cost and Technology Changes
From Proposition 2, a reduction in τ reduces the support [Ω2L(τ),Ω2U (τ)].7 Therefore,
as transaction costs become smaller, outsourcing is more likely to occur.8 Notice that this
result holds regardless of whether the initial value of (krx)/(Kθry) is greater or smaller
than 1/2.
The eﬀect of technology changes, however, will depend on whether (krx)/(Kθry) is greater
or smaller than 1/2. Suppose that the recent progress in the general purpose technology (e.g.,
information technology, etc.) reduces modification costs (i.e., rx and ry) and hence increases
the degree of economies of scope in production. But the impact is likely to be diﬀerent
for the production of the final good and the intermediate input. A technology progress
favors economies of scope in the final-good production relative to the intermediate-input
production if it reduces rx/ry. Therefore, a progress of GPT that favors economies of scope
in production of the final good will increase outsoucing if (krx)/(Kθry) is smaller than 1/2
(Point A in Figure 3), and it will not if (krx)/(Kθry) is greater than 1/2 (Point B). The
opposite would be true if a progress of GPT favors economies of scope in production of the
intermediate input. Therefore, we have the following results.
Proposition 4 A reduction in transaction costs always increases outsourcing but a tech-
nology progress may not.
However, when a technology progress is continuous and its eﬀect is persistently biased
towards one stage of production (i.e., rx/ry continues to decrease or increase), eventually it
will lead to the outsourcing equilibrium. The automobile industry is probably the best ex-
ample to apply this theory if we believe that technology progresses favor economies of scope
in the final-good production in the car industry (i.e., rx/ry continue to decrease). Recent
technology progresses (e.g., computer-aided-design) have made model changes and product
7When τ = 0, the support reduces to zero since Ω2L(τ) = Ω2U (τ) = 1/2.
8This is similar to what is found in the literature that reductions of transaction costs may contribute to
the recent surge of outsourcing activities. The discussion of the current paper is focused on other issues,
however.
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improvement much easier than ever before. These changes would certainly contribute to
the surge of outsourcing activities in the automobile industry. To summarize,
Proposition 5 Continuous progresses in general purpose technology that has a persistently
biased eﬀect on economies of scope in one stage of production (e.g., final goods) over the
other (e.g., intermediate goods) lead to more outsourcing activities.
Persistent changes in the relative fixed cost of production, k/K, will have similar eﬀects
but since the focus of the current paper is on economies of scope, we leave the discussion
about economies of scale to the reader.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper develops a model of two-stage production in which economies of scope are cen-
tral to the production of both the intermediate input and the final good. The intermediate
input in the model can be interpreted as an intermediate good, service, or other produc-
tion related activity. Therefore, we hope the model provides a relatively simple framework
that is able to shed some light on the characteristics/attribute of wide-ranging outsourcing
activities.
In this paper we have only considered to cases: one is a complete vertical integration and
the other is a complete vertical disintegration. We do not allow vertically-integrated firms
and specialized firms to co-exist. This simple dichotomy not only simplifies the analysis
but also helps bring out the key insight. Nevertheless, this is a limitation of the paper and
relaxing this assumption could be an interesting extension of the model.
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